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THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SOCIAL

DEMOCRATIC STATE: Taking a Fresh Look at

Waldron's Dignity, Rights, and
Responsibilities
Richard A. Epstein*
In his recent lecture, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities,' my NYU
colleague Jeremy Waldron shows his deep analytical grasp of how three
large and elusive concepts can cohere as part of a single whole. As is his
wont, Waldron is by nature an inclusionist. He seeks to find the best of all
different strands of political and legal theory in order to integrate them into
a coherent and nuanced system. At one point, he is quite content to speak of
the natural rights of property as found in John Locke. 2 On the next occasion,
there is a favorable reference to some Marxist conception of dignity or
citizenship.3 Indeed, the paper is replete with learned references to Marquis
de Condorcet,4 Immanuel Kant,' Max Weber,' Francisco Suarez,' and
others. I cannot find one reference to a learned author of whom Waldron
was overtly critical.
This mode of writing does help to promote civility and deliberation,
which are of course key goals that Waldron has worked to pursue for a long
time. Yet at the same time this form of ecumenicalism has its price, because
it is hard to tell where Waldron comes down on issues of production and
redistribution that have driven huge wedges into both British and American
society, to mention only the two closest to home. His style makes it too easy
for him to look at many of these questions of dignity, rights and
responsibilities from a high perch, which in turn allows him to
underemphasize events as they unfold on the ground.

*.
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; the Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall
Distinguished Service Professor and senior lecturer, The University of Chicago.
1. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2012).
2.
Id. at 1125-26.
3.
Id. at 1122.
4.
Id. at 1126.
5. Id. at 1127.
6.
Id. at 1122.
7.
Id. at 1128.

HeinOnline -- 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 1169 2011

1170

ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Here is one example of his method. Rather than talk about the intense
populist struggles in both countries, his essay begins with some probing
questions about the so called Straw Report, which takes as its point of
departure a Green Paper which offered some preliminary observations about
Rights and Responsibilities: Developing our Constitutional Framework'
written by Jack Straw and Michael Wills, high officials in the former
Labour government of then Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Yet at no point
does he connect this Green Report or others like it to the fiscal breakdown
in England that led to the appointment of David Cameron as the British
Prime Minister on May 11, 2010.9 Cameron has referred enigmatically to
the Green Paper.'o But nothing he has said about it has anything to do with
his tottering austerity program, featuring severe budget cuts intended to
curb runaway deficits brought on by huge set of public entitlements that
could no longer be funded even through ruinously high taxes."
The British are of course not unique in their ability to use government
power to create and enforce an unsustainable set of entitlements. The same
story has played out in Greece, Spain, and Italy; not to mention the United
States, where social democratic institutions have not been able to bring their
expenditures and revenues in line. As this paper is being written, the United
States funds about forty percent of its current expenditures through
borrowing, a figure that is not touched by the recent resolution of the debt
crisis. The United States has not retained its triple-A credit rating with
Standard and Poor's after its latest escape, and although Moody's and Fitch
has not yet downgraded the United States, they have put it on special
notice.' 2
What is so clear about each and every one of these system failures is that
they come in societies that respond eagerly to claims of rights,
responsibilities and dignity. In the abstract, it is difficult to inveigh against
8.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES: DEVELOPING
OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, 2009, Cm. 7577 (U.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/

publications/docs/rights-responsibilities.pdf
9.

Andrew Porter, David Cameron is the New Prime Minister, TELEGRAPH, May 11,

2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/7713094/David-Cameron-isthe-new-Prime-Minister.html.
10. Waldron, supra note 1, at 1109.
11. Svenja O'Donnell & Robert Hutton, Cameron Presses on with Budget Squeeze as
Retailers Suffer, BLOOMBERG, July 5, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0704/cameron-presses-on-with-u-k-budget-cuts-as-consumers-suffer-stores-close.html
("Prime
Minister David Cameron's refusal to compromise on the most ambitious fiscal squeeze since
World War II is testing Britain's recovery as consumers lose faith in the economy.").
12.

Martin Crutsinger, Moody's Backs US Triple-A Rating; Outlook Negative, DAILY

Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2011/aug/5/moodys-backs-ustriple-a-rating-outlook-negative/.
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any of these virtues. But at the same time it is difficult to be for any set of
virtues that may well have undermined the fiscal responsibility of so many
programs. The key task in this public debate therefore is to sharpen the
discussion by asking what kind of dignity, rights and responsibilities are
involved. It is just at this point that we should take a hard look at the older
distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations.13 Properly
understood, that distinction calls into question every major assumption of
the modem social democratic paradigm that calls for extensive government
regulation of private business and a broad safety net which includes the
right to education, health care, housing or any other positive right any one
cares to mention. These extensive claims of right have failed.
To see why this is the case, start with Waldron's sound observation that
rights and responsibilities are often correlative, such that there cannot be the
creation of a new right unless and until the correlative duties are specified.14
That means that we have to know for each new right who is on the hook and
for how much. At this point, the key questions are what rights, what
responsibilities, and for what reasons.
On this issue, my major premise is that individuals should have
responsibilities to others to take care of themselves first, and to take care of
others in need second. The first of these responsibilities means that all
persons should work hard to obtain a degree of self-sufficiency so that they
do not become a burden on others. The second means that when some
individuals do fall through the cracks, there are some others who stand
ready to extend a hand. The distinction matters because different sorts of
institutions should be used to back up these different types of rights and
responsibilities. More concretely, the individual rights that should receive
legal protection are those which grant them the opportunity to become selfsufficient in the first instance, imposing nonenforceable duties to aid others
in need only in the few cases where self-help does not succeed.
To implement this type of a program, we need to revert to the system of
perfect and imperfect obligations that were part and parcel of the classical
liberal tradition that gave birth to, among other oft-disfavored social
arrangements, laissez-faire. Perfect obligations are backed by the force of
the state, such that the violator is exposed to damages, injunctions, fines and
other criminal sanctions. The first of these perfect obligations are to respect
the bodily integrity and private property of all other persons, which means
that there can be no murder, molestation, theft, rape or bodily harm. This
protection against the use of force is no optional extra, but lies at the core of
13.

For discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
76 (2003).
Waldron, supra note 1, at 1110-11.

SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE

FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM

14.
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our social obligations to each other. No matter how complex the society, no
matter what the number of individuals in it, no matter what the overall level
of wealth in society, these obligations are and remain fundamental. They
should not be forgotten in particular cases simply because they are usually
respected in most cases. Each person who escapes these obligations
increases the social instability and diminishes the basic liberties of others.
The second of the perfect obligations has to do with keeping of promises
to perform or abstain from individual actions. Individuals of full age and
intelligence must take responsibility for their own actions. Holding them
responsible when they make unwise bargains gives them the strong
incentive to make wise ones the next time round. At this point, the
requirement for self-sufficiency does not degenerate into a system-wide
autarky in which individuals can rely only on their abilities to meet their
fundamental biological and familial needs. They can expand the resources
under their disposal by entering into those arrangements that they see as
prudent. The ability to sell one's labor in an open market is a primary
human right that should be protected against the interference by others,
including the state.
People will often cite to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which proclaims "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world."" Those grand words must be
fleshed out because they fall short of explaining which rights are equal and
inalienable. To my mind those rights involve full civil capacity for all
persons of full age and sound mind to enter into particular arrangements. It
is, however, possible to invoke those same words to impose a radically
different vision that involves extensive social protections that quickly
require a huge social apparatus that prohibits certain labor contracts on the
grounds that they do not meet minimum wage standards, or that mandates
other contracts so that people cannot discriminate on the grounds of sex,
race, age and the like. The decision to block private labor contracts or to
force them on unwilling parties counts as a huge social mistake even if they
are covered by the American antidiscrimination laws or the European
Convention on Human Rights. 16 The greatest protection for people against
the risks of discrimination is a competitive market with free entry under
which the perverse decisions of any one prospective employer (or
employee) is offset by the opportunities to work with others. The need for
15. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948).
16. For my unrepentant views, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
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guarantees against discrimination therefore should run against the state or
other monopoly providers of services. They are surely not needed in labor
markets, where the choices are always open so long as anyone can just
decide to hire others as workers.
What all Western nations have to break is the now deadly cycle that says,
first, we "protect" people against exploitation, and then when they cannot
find a job, shower them with unemployment benefits that require higher
taxes, which in turn further reduce the opportunities that are available to
others. It is, in my view, no accident that the stagnant American labor
market is kept back by a set of high regulations that block new job creation,
and an unprecedented set of benefits now running to ninety-nine weeks,
which require extensive revenues to run, which was just extended in
August, 2011.17
Yes, given a dismal performance that only gets worse with time, I would
at this point phase out the system, because we have shown no ability
whatsoever to contain it within reasonable amounts. Obviously, that will not
happen, so the short term objective should be to reduce it to something
under half its size. By the same token, it is a high moral imperative that
someone, somehow, has to find a way to undo all the one-sided contracts
that national, state and local governments have entered into with their
unionized workforces, which call for a set of unsustainable pension and
health care obligations. No government should ever consent to hire workers
in other than a competitive marketplace, period. The top priority that these
contracts receive under current law has wrecked the financial support for
other social support networks which depend on discretionary public
revenues that are no longer available (it is not possible to undo institutions
that perhaps never should have been created in the first place, including
programs that deal with childcare and the disabled). A firm commitment, to
never again allow one group to take over public resources would go a long
way to the contribution of social stability. The claim that workers have
rights to perpetuate these one-sided arrangements ignores the intolerable
financial burdens that these outsized contracts impose on everyone else.
At this point, one could easily ask, so what is to be done with those who
cannot care for themselves? To this query, the answer comes in two parts.
The first is that if we reduce the welfare component and remove the
obstacles to the formation of new contracts, we reduce that number of
individuals to a small fraction of what it is today. The second is that we
return to a system of imperfect obligations whereby people with means take
17. New Developments on Federal Unemployment Extensions, ST. CAL. EMP. DEV. DEP'T,
http://www.edd.ca.gov/unemployment/Federal_UnemploymentInsuranceExtensions.htm (last
updated Nov. 1, 2011).

HeinOnline -- 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 1173 2011

1174

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

it upon themselves to help fund private charitable organizations that provide
targeted support for whomever they wish to help, on whatever terms they
choose to supply. In this market, we can expect that all individual helpers,
large and small, will have different agendas, and will choose to assist
different individuals. Just let the chips fall where they may. No government
should try to tame these divergent impulses, which supply the kind of
redundancy and resiliency in private markets that is missing in a monolithic
state-run system whose collapse leaves no viable back-up.
The key for making this system work is keeping these second-tier
responsibilities out from enforcement through the legal system, which is
why these obligations are called "imperfect." Charities should not be told
whom to take in, how much to spend, or whom they can exclude. Left alone
they will flourish; supervised they will falter. It is critical to break the
mindset that allows everyone to think that everyone else owes them positive
rights of support. People should never be in the position where they can yell
"tax the rich" before the state house and receive a favorable answer from
legislatures who are prepared to satisfy their wishes in exchange for votes.
But individuals in need can appeal to conscience, to empathy, to a sense of
justice to prod people along their way. More importantly, they could rely on
the actions of sensible intermediaries that will be organized through
churches, fraternal organizations, friendly societies-you name it-to pitch
in. It is not only the politicians that understand the burdens of poverty. It is
ordinary people, both rich and poor, who can figure this out on their own.
The one great virtue of this system of imperfect obligations is that its
success cannot break the public purse by running up the excessive
entitlements that dominate the provision of health care and social security.
Those who don't want to help the unfortunate can free ride on the rest of
us-a system flaw that we should tolerate when the alternative form of
ostensible public compassion leads us to a bloated public sector that is taken
over by interest groups whose own sense of priorities does little to help
those who are in need.
Yet what about the dignity of the individual? Here no one should have to
grovel, and they won't, at least if they are given multiple opportunities to
work. But by the same token, there is no dignity in becoming a ward of the
state because you cannot find work in a system which throws up so many
barriers to gainful employment so that enforced idleness turns out to be a
frequent, if unwanted, fate. Nor does any sense of self-worth come from
then ability to game the system. The world is filled with scarcities. The
question of social institutions is not how to make matters perfect for
everyone. All systems fail that test. It is to understand that our current
dominant views of social rights and responsibilities have stressed the
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positive rights to social support over the negative rights to be free of
government interference in the conduct of one's own life. The dominant
regime of positive rights is not only intellectually bankrupt, but it is
financially bankrupt as well. It places onerous burdens on honest people and
affording too many opportunities for the less honest to game the system.
It should be evident that in our current economic downturn, no one can
treat the issues of dignity, rights and responsibilities as academic disputes
among the learned. It is time to take a substantive position on their content.
My view is that the long-treasured attitudes toward rights, responsibilities
and human dignity in social democratic tradition in which Waldron works is
on the verge of disintegration. Once we recognize that point, we have to
return to an older system of rights and responsibilities, which will do more
for human dignity than we can ever wring out of the current legal regime.
The transitions from the current system are, to say the least difficult, if
there were a broad social consensus, which today there is not, that some
major repair is needed. Some half measures could well go a long way to
curing the defects of the current system. But make no mistake about it.
Unless we can reverse our course soon, the current situation will only
intensify. The older classical liberal tradition, with its clear combination of
perfect and imperfect duties, offers the only path out of the current malaise.
An inclusionary frame of mind that sees the pluses and minuses of all
positions will not work anymore. We need to worry less about the glories of
deliberation, which have long appealed to Waldron," and more about
making sure that we get the right answer from deliberation. We have to junk
the broken theory of dignity, rights and responsibilities that dominates
public discourse today, and return to the more modest, and more effective,
classical liberal program.

18. Waldron, supra note 1; Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of
Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596 (2010).
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